Bertie puts his finger on it

It is a rather curious fact in philosophy that the data which are undeniable to start with are always rather vague and ambiguous. You can, for instance, say: ``there are a number of people in this room at this moment.'' That is obviously in some sense undeniable. But when you come to try and define what this room is, and what it is for a person to be in a room, and how you are going to distinguish one person from another, and so forth, you find that what you have said is most fearfully vague and that you really do not know what you meant. That is a rather singular fact, that everything you are really sure of right off is something that you do not know the meaning of, and the moment you get a precise statement you will not be sure whether it is true or false, at least right off. The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly in passing from these obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we started with, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow.

Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

Bertie was often wrong about the details, but he always knew which things mattered.
Thanks to Nick Treanor for showing me this text.
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